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PRIMARY JURISDICTION: THE RULE AND ITS
RATIONALIZATIONS
ISRAEL GONVISSER-i
ACCRE-TION of the administrative process is one of the phenomena of our
times. Delegations of executive and legislative authority are steadily expand-
ing the administrative domain, often into regions previously occupied only
by the judiciary. A resulting problem has been to redefine the boundaries of
judicial jurisdiction where it is abutted or encroached upon by administrative
jurisdiction.
A judicial contribution to this redefinition has been the rule of exclusive
primary administrative jurisdiction, which removes formerly justiciable issues
from the province of the courts and relegates them to administrative adjudi-
cation. Like the administrative process of which it is so important a part, the
rule is a dynamic and expanding one. In its earliest application 1 it made
the lawfulness of a past railroad rate a matter for exclusive initial administra-
tive jurisdiction. In its later development it has extended the scope of ad-
ministrative competence to include what in effect amounts to the granting or
withholding of immunity from the antitrust laws.2
There is no question but that the rule serves a useful purpose-to prevent
premature or undue judicial interference with the administrative process.
Whether the rule serves this purpose effectively is another question-and
one that is being debated.2 But debate about proper application cannot be
meaningful out of the context of the scheme of administrative regulation of
which the rule is an adjunct. And unfortunately, the organic relationship
between the rule of primary jurisdiction and the administrative process as a
whole has too often been obscured by the rationalizations that have marked
the rule's birth and growth.
As a result, the rule has been applied in curious ways that reflect little
understanding of its essential purpose. That any rule should never be mis-
applied is, of course, beyond reasonable expectation. Allowance must be made
for hard cases and human shortcomings. But misapplications of this rule,
beyond normal expectancy, must inevitably spring from the sophisms with
which the literature of primary jurisdiction abounds. It is the purpose of this
tMember of the District of Columbia and New York Bars.
1. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
2. See Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 916 (1953), discussed in text at pp. 332-35 infra.
3. Professor Louis B. Schwartz thinks the rule has been overextended: Legal Restric-
tion of Competition in the Regulated Industries: an Abdication of .udicial Responsibility,
67 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954) ; Robert B. von Mehren thinks not: The Antitrust Laws and
Regulated Industries: the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 id. at 929. See also Jaffe,
Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954).
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paper to dissipate some of the fog of misunderstanding that has prevented
realistic appreciation and application of the rule. To start, we must go back
half a century to the moment when the rule, conceived in error, was launched
on its questionable career.
GENESIS
The primary jurisdiction rule, a sesame in reverse, was first invoked in
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.4 to lock a judicial door
that the applicable statute had held open. It was the creation of Justice White
who, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, held that under what is now
known as the Interstate Commerce Act a shipper seeking reparations from
a railroad for excessive freight charges must "primarily invoke redress
through the Interstate Commerce Commission." 5
This ruling, divesting the courts of jurisdiction they had long exercised,
is a classic of judicial legislation. It did violence to the plain statutory language
and purpose, ignored the legislative history and rested upon reasoning mainly
notable for its comfortable insulation from reality. To see where the Abilene
decision went astray, we must first examine the Act to Regulate Commerce,7
since the case turned entirely upon construction of that statute.
The Act to Regulate Commerce
As originally enacted, the Act created the Interstate Commerce Commission
but gave it no power to establish rates for the future,8 except insofar as a rate
for the future, as a practical matter, necessarily resulted from an order direct-
;ng the carrier to desist from charging a rate found by the Commission to
have been invalid in the past. Carriers had to publish their rates and file them
with the Commission. They were required to give ten days' public notice
in advance of any increase in rates but could make decreases without advance
notice. Deviations from published rates were otherwise prohibited.9 The Act
required rates to be reasonable and just; outlawed rebates, discriminations,
preferences and advantages; and subjected the carriers to liability for damages
to persons injured by violations of the Act, as well as to criminal prosecution
and fines therefor.
Upon receipt of a complaint, which could be filed by any person or organiza-
tion, the Commission was directed to forward a statement of the charges to
4. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
5. Id. at 448.
6. The Court said, "Without going into detail, it may not be doubted that at common
law, where a carrier refused to receive goods offered for carriage except upon the payment
of an unreasonable sum, the shipper had a right of action in damages." Id. at 436.
7. C. 104, 24 STAT. 379 (1887).
8. This power was supplied by the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 4, 34 STAT. 589.
9. The Act of March 2, 1889, required three days' advance notice of a rate decrease.
C. 382, § 6, 25 STAT. 856. By the Act of June 29, 1906, thirty days' advance notice of any
change in rates was required, but the Commission was authorized to allow changes on
shorter notice. C. 3591, § 2, 34 STAT. 586.
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the carrier. If the carrier made reparation it was relieved of liability for that
violation. If the carrier did not satisfy the complaint or there was reasonable
ground for investigating, the Commission was to conduct an investigation and
make a written report containing findings which were to be deemed prima
facie evidence, as to the facts found, in all subsequent judicial proceedings. If
the Commission found the carrier guilty of a violation it could require the
carrier to cease and desist, to make reparation, or both.
Section 16 of the Act made it the duty of the Commission and the right
of any person interested, in the event of the carrier's failure to "obey any
lawful order or requirement of the Commission,"' 0 to apply to the United
States circuit court (not to be confused with the circuit court of appeals)
sitting in equity in the judicial district in which the carrier had its principal
office or in which the violation or disobedience of the order occurred. If the
court found that the lawful order of the Commission had been disobeyed
it could award damages and issue a writ of injunction or other proper process.
But there was no provision for resort to court by the complainant in the event
of a Commission finding in favor of the carrier.
Two sections of the Act secured for the courts, in addition to the jurisdic-
tion granted in section 16, original jurisdiction of certain suits within the
scope of the Act. Section 9 provided in part:
"That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common
carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint
to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his
or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such com-
mon carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district
or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such
person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies,
and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure
herein provided for he or they will adopt. .. .
And section 22 expressly stated that "nothing in this act contained shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies .... -12
The history of the Act leaves no doubt that the languag6 of sections 9 and
22 was a plain statement of an unequivocal legislative intention that the courts
should have original jurisdiction of some matters that might also be in the
Commission's province. When first introduced in Congress in 1886, the bill 13
did not contain the provisions of section 9 which spelled out the alternative
judicial and administrative remedies, though it did include the provision pre-
serving common law and statutory remedies then in existence. Yet Senator
Cullom, Chairman of the Select Committee on Interstate Commerce and the
man whose name the bill bore, told the Senate:
10. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 16, 24 STAT. 384 (1887).
11. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 9, 24 STAT. 382 (1887).
12. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 22, 24 STAT. 387 (1887).
13. S. 1532, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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"Under the terms of the bill no one is obliged to appeal to the commission,
and two courses are open to anyone who may be aggrieved by the viola-
tion of any one of these general provisions which I have mentioned. He
is simply obliged to elect which course he will adopt, and may at his
own pleasure either bring suit in the courts on his own account for the
recovery of overcharges or damages, or he may ask the commission
to arbitrate the controversy, and, if necessary, to investigate his complaint,
the advantage of the latter course being that in the event of a favorable
finding by the commission his evidence is collected for him without ex-
expense to himself, and he can if it becomes necessary go into court with
a prima facie case already established."'
14
After the bill had been put into its final form by a Senate-House conference
committee, Representative Crisp of the committee reported to the House:
"Mr. Speaker, we do not drive the complainant to the Railroad Com-
mission. If he chooses to go there he has the right to go and invoke this
power which is created by the Government for his protection; but if he
prefers, for any reason, to go to the courts of the country, they are open
to him. The same judge who passes upon his rights of property, his
rights of life and liberty, will there pass upon his rights in his dealings
with the railroads.
"He can go to the commission, but if he is one of those who, either
from suspicion or for any other reason, believes that this commission will
not do right, then he can go into court and file his suit and have it tried
as every other case is tried. . .. "15
Throughout the protracted debate the construction given by Senator Cullom
and Representative Crisp to the provisions preserving the judicial forum for
reparation suits was never challenged.
The Abilene Case
The Abilene Company attempted to use the common law remedy preserved by
Congress. Without resorting to the Interstate Commerce Commission, it brought
suit in a Texas state court to recover damages from the Texas and Pacific
Railway for allegedly excessive charges for the transportation of freight. The
state court, finding the rate unreasonable and excessive, nevertheless held that
since the rate had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission it was
the rate "established under the interstate commerce law," and gave judgment
for the defendant. 16
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed.17 It stated the issue as
"whether in a state court a shipper in cases of interstate carriage can, by the
principles of the common law, be accorded relief from unjust and unreasonable
freight rates extracted from him, or shall relief in such cases be denied merely
14. 17 CONG. REc. 3471 (1886).
15. 18 id. at 784 (1887).
16. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1907).
17. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 85 S.W. 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
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because such unreasonable rate has been filed and promulgated by the carrier
under the interstate commerce act?"18 The court found the answer in the
common law right of action which it ruled had been preserved by the Act.19
The United States Supreme Court posited its reversal upon what it deemed
to have been the legislative intent as demonstrated by the following propo-
sitions:
1. The Act "made it unlawful [for the carrier] to depart from the rates
in the established schedules until the same were changed as authorized by the
act. .... "20
2. The Act showed "an indissoluble unity between the provision for the
establishment and maintenance of rates until corrected in accordance with the
statute and the prohibitions against preferences and discrimination."
2 1
3. If "the standard of rates fixed in the mode provided by the statute could
be treated on the complaint of a shipper by a court and jury as unreasonable,
without reference to prior action by the Commission, finding the established
rate to be unreasonable and ordering the carrier to desist in the future from
violating the act, it would come to pass that a shipper might obtain relief upon
the basis that the established rate was unreasonable, in the opinion of a court
and jury, and thus such shipper would receive a preference or discrimination
not enjoyed by those against whom the schedule of rates was continued to
be enforced."' 2
4. Existence of original jurisdiction in the courts would afford "a ready
means by which, through collusive proceedings, the wrongs which the statute
was intended to remedy could be successfully inflicted."
23
5. If the "power existed in both courts and the Commission to originally
hear complaints on this subject .... the established schedule might be found
reasonable by the Commission in the first instance and unreasonable by a court
acting originally, and thus a conflict would arise which would render the en-
forcement of the act impossible," since the Commission would thus be made
incapable of performing its function of bringing about uniform rates.2 4
6. Section 9 could not have authorized the courts to have original juris-
diction of reparation suits since the section "contemplates only a decree in
favor of the individual complainant, redressing the particular wrong asserted
to have been done, and does not embrace the power to ... command a cor-
rection of the established schedules," which only the Commission has; conse-
quently, the section "must be confined to redress of such wrongs as can, con-
sistently with the context of the act, be redressed by courts without previous
action by the Commission, and, therefore, does not imply the power in a court
18. Id. at 1053.
19. Id. at 1054-55.
20. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
21. Id. at 440.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 441.
24. Ibid.
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to primarily hear complaints concerning wrongs of the character of the one
here complained of."
25
7. Similarly, section 22 could not be construed as perpetuating "a common
law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent
with the provisions of the act .... The clause is concerned alone with rights
recognized in or duties imposed by the act, and the manifest purpose of the
provision in question was to make plain the intention that any specific remedy
given by the act should be regarded as cumulative, when other appropriate
common law or statutory remedies existed for the redress of the particular
grievance or wrong dealt with in the act."'2 6
Having noted the principle of statutory construction that "repeals by impli-
cation are not favored, '2 7 and having rejected an argument that harm would
result from depriving the courts of jurisdiction as "an argument of incon-
venience which assails the wisdom of the legislation or its efficiency and affords
no justification for so interpreting the statute as to destroy it.'"- the Court
laid down the rule "that a shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the
unreasonableness of the established rate must, under the act to regulate com-
merce, primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which body alone is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for
the alteration of an established schedule, because the rates fixed therein are
unreasonable .. ."29
The major emphasis of the reasoning was' upon the aim of uniformity. The
Court maintained that discriminations would inevitably ensue unless the hold-
ing that a rate had been unlawful and must be desisted from in the future
was uniformly applied, and that this could be achieved only by requiring
resort to the Commission in the first instance.
Abilene Analyzed
Both the assumptions and the logic of the Abilene decision are open to
question. To begin with, the likelihood of original actions at law occurring in
sufficient numbers to threaten the success of Commission regulation seems to
have been considerably exaggerated. Senator Cullom, explaining why his com-
mittee had deemed it desirable to provide an alternative to the common law
remedy, read from the committee report the following statement by Chairman
Kernan of the New York Commission:
" 'Assuredly there have been and do exist unreasonable rates and
unjust discriminations. This much will be admitted by all; it will not
be denied even by any carrier. Why, then, have not the courts enjoined
the continuance of the wrongs and enforced the payment of damages?
Why, again, is it that substantially no such suits ever have been brought
and that so few decisions in this country exist? It is not because of
25. Id. at 442.
26. Id. at 446-47.
27. Id. at 437.
28. Id. at 447.
29. Id. at 448.
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defects in the law or in the constitution of the courts; but it is because
the subject is one which neither client nor lawyer, judge nor jury, can
unravel or deal with intelligently within the compass of an ordinary trial
and with such knowledge of the matter as men generally well educated
possess .... As the onus is upon the complainant, add to his difficulties
the fact that his adversary has nearly all the evidence in his possession,
locked up in books and in the memory and intelligence of experts who
have made the subject their study. The expense involved, the uncertainty
to be faced, and the difficulties to be overcome in an ordinary suit at law
have made that remedy obsolete and useless.' 30
Exaggeration of the magnitude of the problem, however, was a lesser error.
More serious was the significance the Court attached to the statutory require-
ment that rates be adhered to unless and until changed as "authorized by the
act." 31  It stated that to hold that there was original jurisdiction in the
courts "would necessitate the holding that a cause of action in favor of a shipper
arose from the failure of the carrier to make an agreement, when, if the agree-
ment had been made, both the carrier and the shipper would have been guilty
of a criminal offense and the agreement would have been so absolutely void
as to be impossible of enforcement. '32 This was less than a fair statement.
Actually, all that the Act imposed in this connection was a publication and
filing requirement that left the railroad otherwise free to change its rates.
Nothing in the Act prevented alteration of rates at the time of the overcharge
so long as the statutory notice was given.3 3 The issue in a suit such as the
Abilene Company's was not whether the carrier could or should have charged
rates other than those published, but rather whether the rates as published
were excessive.
The matter of adherence to published rates stood at the threshhold of the
uniformity argument. The Court was no doubt correct in reading the Act
as seeking to establish and enforce uniformity of rates.34 But it should be
30. 17 CoNG. REc. 3474 (1886).
31. See text at note 20 supra.
32. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 445 (1907). The
statement that the shipper would have been guilty of a criminal offense presumably
referred to the Elkins Act of Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 STAT. 847. But the cause of action
arose in 1901, two years before that Act became law.
33. See Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1907), which affirmed
the conviction of a shipper under the Elkins Act, see note 32 supra, for paying a railroad,
after the railroad had published an increase in rates, the rate contracted for pursuant
to the schedule in effect at the time of the contract.
And in ICC v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 209 U.S. 108 (1908), the circuit court had set aside
a Commission order directing the carrier to desist from charging a rate found to have
been unlawful. Affirming, the Supreme Court said:
"It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of their
owners.... [T]he act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers, as they were
at common law, free to make special rates looking to the increase of their business,
to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates . . . and generally to
manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as
sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits." Id. at 118-19.
34. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907).
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noted initially that uniformity of reparations was another matter, and one
with which the Act was not concerned. The fact that one shipper received
greater or lesser reparations than another was not tantamount to a preference
of the sort that the Act was intended to prevent, for it created no real com-
petitive advantage. There could be such an advantage only if a shipper knew
in advance that his freight cost would be less than that of his competitors
and thus could sell at a lower price. But he obviously could not set his prices
on the mere speculation that he would be awarded reparations. It may have
been, of course, that the Court was harboring an unexpressed concern for
the plight of the railroads. These, it is true, were subject under the Act to
the risk of different determinations in different forums. But so had they been
theretofore, when they could have been sued in various courts, both federal
and state. And the plain purpose of the Act was not to improve the situation
of the railroads but to curb their excesses and protect the shippers. Uniform-
ity of reparations was, in sum, no more important than uniformity of damages
in negligence cases.
Uniformity of rates, on the other hand, was of the greatest significance,
and the Court feared that diversity of reparation awards would make uni-
formity of rates impossible. Prior to 1906 the Commission, like the courts,
was without power to establish rates for the future; it could only declare a
rate to have been unlawful in the past." The Court saw in the coupling of
this power with the authority to issue a cease and desist order an equivalent
for the originally withheld authority to set rates for the future,36 but one that
would be greatly weakened by the existence of nearly parallel authority in the
courts.
However, the Act of June 29, 1906, empowering the Commission to estab-
lish rates for the future at the instance of shipper, carrier or others, 37 removed
the basis for the Court's apprehension that varying reparation awards would
prevent uniformity of rates. For the carrier or other interested parties could
apply to the Commission for establishment of a rate for the future. This
rate would come as close to being conclusive and insuring uniformity as was
possible under the Act. Section 15, as amended, provided that "orders of the
Commission, except orders for the payment of money . . . shall continue
in force for such period of time, not exceeding two years, as shall be prescribed
in the order of the Commission, unless the same shall be suspended or modified
or set aside by the Commission or be suspended or set aside by a court of
competent jurisdiction." 38 This amendment, permitting an approximation of
uniformity to be achieved through the rate making authority conferred upon
the Commission, was enacted five years after the cause of action in the
35. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1895); see
Arizona Grocery v. Atchison Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 385 (1932).
36. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907).
37. C. 3591, § 4, 34 STAT. 589.
38. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 4, 34 STAT. 589. The Commission could not award
reparations if it subsequently held a rate so established to have been unreasonable.
Arizona Grocery v. Atchison Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
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Abilene case arose. But it was law when the case was decided, and part of
the context of the case.
Furthermore, Justice White's assumption, that with respect to rates not
prescribed by the Commission uniformity could be achieved by primary ad-
ministrative jurisdiction, wholly overlooked the threat of variation that lay
in the continued existence under the Act of secondary jurisdiction in the
courts. Under section 16 of the Act, if the carrier failed to comply with the
Commission's order a trial of the issue could be had in the circuit court, which
could award a money judgment or other relief.30 When more than twenty
dollars was involved, the seventh amendment to the Constitution gave the
parties the right to trial by a jury.40 And this meant that a determination by
the Commission that a past rate had been unreasonable was subject to over-
turn by court and jury, as was the Commission finding as to the amount of
the overcharge and, consequently, what was a reasonable rate.41 The report
of the Commission would be prima facie evidence of the facts found, but this
evidence could be rebutted. The relative functions of the Commission and
the courts in this respect had been described as follows:
"The suit in this court is, under the provisions of the act, an original and
independent proceeding, in which the commission's report is made prima
facie evidence of the matters or facts therein stated. It is clear that this
court is not confined to a mere re-examination of the case as heard and
reported by the commission, but hears and determines the cause de novo,
upon proper pleadings and proofs, the latter including not only the prima
facie facts reported by the commission, but all such other and further
testimony as either party may introduce, bearing upon the matters in
controversy."
And in another case the Supreme Court recognized the right, though it chided
the railroad for abusing the right, of producing before the court evidence not
offered to the Commission.
43
39. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 16, 24 STAT. 384-85 (1887).
40. Before the Court made the Commission the sole depository of jurisdiction of
reparation claims, the latter body had decided that its jurisdiction, far from being exclusive,
was nonexistent. The original Act of 1887 made no provision for jury trial of a com-
plaint based upon a Commission reparation order. On the contrary, the circuit court
was to determine the matter as a court of equity. But the Commission declined to award
reparations because to do so would violate the seventh amendment. Report of Interstate
Commerce Commission, Dec. 1, 1887, 1 I.C.C. 297-99. This Report also stated that the
Commission had "not discovered in the statute a purpose to confer upon it the general
power to award damages in the cases of which it may take cognizance. The failure to
provide in terms for a judgment and execution is strong negative testimony against such
a purpose. . . ." Id. at 298. The Act of March 2, 1889, c. 382, § 5, 25 STAT. 860-61,
amended § 16 to make jury trials available in such cases.
41. The court or jury could reduce a reparation award by the Commission. Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Minds, 250 U.S. 368 (1919). It could not, however, give a judgment
in excess of the award. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448 (1933).
42. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R. 37 Fed. 567, 614 (C.C.
'Ky. 1889), appeal dismissed, 149 U.S. 777 (1893); see Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v.
Denver & R.G.R.R., 200 Fed. 614 (D. Colo. 1912), aff'd, 209 Fed. 577 (8th Cir. 1913).
43. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1895).
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In these circumstances the Court in the Abilene case clearly exaggerated
the extent to which closing the judicial door to damage suits would result in
uniformity of decision as to either reparations or the unreasonableness of past
rates. Uniformity would be assured only in findings that past rates had been
reasonable, since, as will be discussed shortly, there was no recourse to
judicial review of such determinations.44 In any event, the Court's conclusion
that the "standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent
conclusions reached as to reasonableness by the various courts, ' 4r would
apply almost as fully to cases in which the Commission made the primary
determination as to those in which the courts might have done so.
The Court in Abilene asserted that primary judicial determination would
affect only the litigating parties whereas the administrative order would have
greater reach. 46 This argument has some merit, but the Court seems to have
overlooked or ignored the following provision of the Act of February 19, 1903:
"See. 2. That in any proceeding for the enforcement of the provisions
of the statutes relating to interstate commerce, whether such proceedings
be instituted before the Interstate Commerce Commission or be begun
originally in any circuit court of the United States, it shall be lawful to
include as parties, in addition to the carrier, all persons interested in or
affected by the rate, regulation, or practice under consideration, and
inquiries, investigations, orders, and decrees may be made with reference
to and against such additional parties in the same manner, to the same
extent, and subject to the same provisions as are or shall be authorized
by law with respect to carriers.
' '47
It was thus possible in a single adjudication to bind a substantial number of
parties in interest and so reduce the likelihood of divergent determinations.4"
In sum, the principal thrust of the Abilene opinion-that primary admini-
strative jurisdiction would assure uniformity of regulation, and concurrent
jurisdiction prevent it-was awry. The slight marginal gain in uniformity
seems hardly sufficient to justify overturning, in the name of the general
congressional scheme, the explicitly declared intention of Congress. This in-
tention, that the courts should retain concurrent jurisdiction, had been ex-
pressed in sections 9 and 22. The Court avoided the plain meaning of these
sections, and read them to refer to suits other than for reparations, in order
44. This is no longer so, however. See note 60 in!ra.
45. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907).
46. See text at note 25 supra.
47. Act of Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, § 2, 32 SAT. 848.
48. This section, although not referred to, seems to have been the basis for bringing
in additional parties in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481 (1910).
This was a petition in mandamus by the operator of a coal mine, charging discrimination
by the railroad in the distribution of coal cars. Six coal companies that were allegedly
receiving preferences were joined as defendants, as were thirty-one independent coal
companies that were presumably suffering discrimination. The petition, granted below,
was ordered dismissed on the ground that the complaint should have been made to the
Commission in the first instance.
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to square them with its premise of uniformity. When the premise falls, so
must the strained statutory interpretation built upon it.
Underlying Justice White's construction of the statute was, it seems, the
feeling that concurrent jurisdiction, whether intended by Congress or not,
would be entirely unworkable. In a later case he elaborated this, addressing
himself to the question whether Commission or courts would prevail if, having
concurrent jurisdiction, they made conflicting determinations. He concluded
that if both prevailed,
"then discrimination and preference would result from, the very prevalence
of the two methods of procedure. If, on the contrary, the commission
was bound to follow the previous action of the courts, then it is apparent
that its power to perform its administrative functions would be curtailed,
if not destroyed. On the other hand, if the action of the commission was
to prevail, then the function exercised by the court would not have been
judicial in character, since its final conclusion would be susceptible of
being set aside by the action of a mere administrative body."
'49
This reasoning overlooked a number of considerations. In the first place,
neither Commission nor court had to prevail. The awards of both could stand.
As already noted, uniformity of damages in this area is no more important
than uniformity of any other kind of damages. And diversity of damages is
inherent in our judicial system. In the second place, neither courts nor Com-
mission would totally prevail even under the Act as interpreted in Abilene.
Upon determination by the Commission that the carrier had violated the Act,
the complainant would in any event have the choice of asking the Commission
to award reparations or bringing a law suit for damages,50 so that concurrent
jurisdiction persisted. And even when the Commission took initial jurisdic-
tion, its findings of fact could be overturned by court or jury and its conclu-
sions of law by the court. As to the latter the courts necessarily had to prevail,
and the Commission would have had to accommodate its own views of the law
to those of the courts whether handed down as a matter of initial jurisdiction
or on review. And on the other hand, the courts' determinations were still
in a sense "susceptible of being set aside by the action of a mere administrative
body,'" 1 since even after the court had made a determination in an enforce-
ment proceeding that a given rate was reasonable, the Commission could
thereafter set the rate at any amount it found appropriate. And review of
such an order other than for the payment of money would not entail de novo
trial but would be limited to the question whether "the order was regularly
made and duly served.
'5 2
Actually, the problem with which Justice White was concerned was one
49. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481, 495 (1910). As mentioned
in note 48 supra, this case involved alleged discrimination in the distribution of coal cars.
So. Terminal Warehouse v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 508 (1936); Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Clark Coal Co., 238 U.S. 456, 470 (1915).
51. See text at note 49 supra.
52. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 STAT. 591.
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commonly encountered and overcome where different forums have concurrent
jurisdiction. In time divergences are drawn together by acts of Congress,
appeals, and application of rules of comity. 53 joinder of parties might have
been utilized to limit the number of cases from which differences could
have resulted. 4 And evidence gathered by the Commission could have been
used in cases brought into court in the first instance.05 Thus, a judicial-
administrative modus vivendi could have been achieved within the framework
of the Act as written, by the use of tools that a resourceful judiciary has
generally been capable of shaping to its needs.
Finally, the Court's argument in Abilene that collusive evasion of the pro-
hibition against preferences and rebates would be easier in the judicial than in
the administrative forum is a makeweight, and a light one. The contrary fact
was that for those who were ready to run the risk of collusive evasion, the Com-
mission proceeding was a convenient means for doing so. Section 13 provided
that upon receipt of a petition the Commission should forward a statement
of charges to the carrier "who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint
or to answer the same in writing .... If such common carrier, within the
time specified, shall make reparation for the injury alleged to have been done,
said carrier shall be relieved of liability to the complainant only for the par-
ticular violation of law thus complained of." 56 At least so far as the mechanics
were concerned, no serious difficulties stood in the way of arranging for a
rebate by having the shipper make a complaint to the Commission which the
carrier would promptly satisfy.
One further point must be noted. The Abilene decision withdrew the right
to a jury trial which the seventh amendment was thought to have preservedY
7
The opinion recognized that unreasonable charges by a common carrier had
been actionable at common law,5s but failed to recognize that sections 9 and
22 of the Act safeguarded the complainant's right to jury trial by authorizing
reparation suits in federal courts and similar suits in state courts. Under the
original statutory scheme, if the shipper wanted a jury trial he could bypass
the Commission; and the carrier could have a jury trial regardless of the
53. "This court has ascribed to them [Commission findings] the strength due to the
judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience." Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907).
54. See text at notes 45-48 supra.
55. The Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 STAT. 592, amended section 16 so as
to provide:
"The copies of schedules and tariffs of rates, fares, and charges, and of all con-
tracts, agreements, or arrangements between common carriers filed with the Commis-
sion as herein provided, and the statistics, tables, and figures contained in the annual
reports of carriers made to the Commission, . . . shall be received as prima facie
evidence of what they purport to be for the purpose of investigations by the Com-
mission and in all judicial proceedings. .. ."
56. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 13, 24 STAT. 384 (1887).
57. See note 40 supra.
58. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436 (1907).
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forum of primary resort.59 Under the scheme as altered by the Abilene de-
cision, if the Commission found in favor of the shipper, he could still have his
suit to enforce the Commission's order tried by jury, but that right was im-
paired by the fact that the jury could not make an award greater than that
of the Commission. And if the Commission found the rate at issue to have
been reasonable the shipper was without recourse to the courts.60 In that
event, denial of access to the courts in the first instance was denial of the right
to trial by jury."'
Thus the remarkable birth of the remarkable rule of primary jurisdiction.
Almost five decades have since elapsed. And still, as if in lingering protest,
section 9 of the Act gives courts and Commission concurrent jurisdiction of
reparation claims and section 22 preserves pre-existing remedies-both in the
identical language, save for changes due to codification, of the original Act
of 1887.02
For all of its dubious origin the rule of primary jurisdiction " became quick-
ly and firmly engrafted on the law, for it answered, however inadequately, the
need for a guide in drawing the line between the jurisdiction of the courts
and those of the proliferating administrative agencies. But the confusion as
to the rule's character and function that attended its birth has haunted its
59. Act of March 2, 1889, c. 382, § 5, 25 STAT. 860.
60. This is no longer so. The "negative order" doctrine, relied upon in Procter &
Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 (1912), was laid to rest in Rochester Tel. Corp.
v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
61. In Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448, 458 (1933), holding that the amount
of the Commission award of reparations was the limit that the complainant could obtain
in court, the opinion stated:
"It is to be remembered that, by electing to call on the Commission for the determin-
ation of his damages, plaintiff waived his right to maintain an action at law upon his
claim. But the carriers made no such election. Undoubtedly it was to the end that
they be not denied the right of trial by jury that Congress saved their right to be
heard in court upon the merits of claims asserted against them. The right of election
given to a claimant reasonably may have been deemed an adequate ground for making
the Commission's award final as to him."
But the complainant, under the Abilene decision, had no right of election of the forum in
which to establish that the rate, rule or practice had been unlawful, a sine qua non to his
right to damages. See Justice Pitney's dissent in Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
230 U.S. 247, 283 (1913) :
"Put is the shipper not entitled to his day in court and to a judicial hearing? Has
the Constitution any greater regard for the right of a carrier to trial by jury than
it has for the right of a shipper? Conceding, as I do, that Congress could not, because
of the Fifth Amendment, make the finding of an administrative body, acting without
jury trial, final as against the carrier, I submit, with great respect, that it gives
an unconstitutional meaning to the Act if we construe it as depriving the shipper
of his remedy without trial by jury."
62. Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, 24 STAT. 382, 387 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§9,22 (1952).
63. The rule has also been denominated the doctrine of "preliminary resort," or "prior
resort." See DAVIs, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 664 (1951).
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
development.6 4 The basic error in Abilene was considering as the rule's pur-
pose and its criterion of applicability the deceptive principle of uniformity.
Eventually this rationalization was supplemented by another which, unfortun-
ately, was little better.
EXPERTISE, THE NEW TOUCHSTONE
Justice Brandeis' statement of the rationale of the rule of primary jurisdic-
tion has become classic:
"Whenever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable or as
unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Com-
mission. Sometimes this is required because the function being exercised
is in its nature administrative in contradistinction to judicial. But ordin-
arily the determining factor is not the character of the function, but the
character of the controverted question and the nature of the enquiry
necessary for its solution. To determine what rate, rule or practice shall
be deemed reasonable for the future is a legislative or administrative
function. To determine whether a shipper has in the past been wronged
by the exaction of an unreasonable or discriminatory rate is a judicial
function. Preliminary resort to the Commission is required alike in the
two classes of cases. It is required because the enquiry is essentially
one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can
be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover,
that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting
evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many
64. An early, perhaps the earliest use of the term primary jurisdiction (Abilene did not
use it) was made in a case that does not seem properly to have involved the rule at all.
The majority opinion in ICC v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 110 (1910) stated:
"We have also said that the primary jurisdiction is with the Commission, the
power of the courts being that of review and is confined in that review to questions
of constitutional power and all pertinent questions as to whether the action of the
Commission is within the scope of the delegated authority under which it purports
to have been made."
The case involved an order issued by the Commission under the 1906 amendment to
§ 15, see text at note 38 supra, directing the railroad to put into effect for the next two
years schedules of reduced freight rates. A circuit court had enjoined enforcement of the
Commission's order, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order was within
the scope of the Commission's constitutional power and delegated authority, beyond which
judicial review could not go.
Unlike Abilene, what was here involved was a legislative act, a rule for the future,
not a judicial determination of past invalidity. And, in contrast to the de novo trial available
on appeal to the courts from Commission orders in reparation cases, review of the Com-
mission's rate setting orders was limited to inquiry into constitutional power and scope
of delegated authority. Cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
The rule laid down by Abilene divested the courts of jurisdiction they had theretofore
possessed. But they had never had jurisdiction to prescribe future rates or to perform
other legislative functions. The reference to primary jurisdiction in ICC v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., supra, thus misleadingly suggested that it is a function of the rule to divest
the courts of jurisdiction they do not in any event have.
Since the courts do not perform a legislative function to start with, a rule is necessary
only to determine when they will not perform their customary judicial functions. It is
to the determination of this question that the rule of primary jurisdiction applies.
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intricate facts of transportation is indispensable; and such acquaintance
is commonly to be found only in a body of experts."'6 5
Uniformity was the major thesis of the Abilene opinion. Expertise played
no part. The Brandeis statement added expert judgment on technical factual
matters as a further justification of the rule of primary jurisdiction-a justifi-
cation that was not only a statement of purpose but a criterion of applicability
as well. As a statement of purpose the suggestion has merit, for the regulatory
commissioners must inevitably acquire specialized knowledge and experience
as a result of the very operation of the primary jurisdiction rule. But as a
test of applicability the expertise doctrine is hardly an improvement over the
uniformity principle of Abilene.
The trouble is that if the primary jurisdiction rule is to apply whenever
there is an expert adjudicating body available, then the rule must have un-
limited applicability in the regulated industries. Logically, this leaves the
courts no jurisdiction in that area at all.
Has the question been too broadly stated? Justice Brandeis, it is true, spoke
of the necessity for administrative expertise as confined to technical matters.
But as a limiting factor this has only a specious plausibility. For ours is a
complex, technological society. The products of highly developed skills are
essential even to the simplest functions of our daily living. And when disputes
arise, in our relations of whatever kind, as often as not adjudication involves
inquiry into technical matters. Indeed, it is difficult to name a single branch of
litigation in which at least a substantial proportion of the cases do not turn
upon technical questions of finance, accounting, engineering, medicine, manu-
facturing methods, distributive patterns, and the like.
For example, to redirect the discussion to the regulated industries, broad
supervisory power over safety measures in their industries has been conferred
upon the Interstate Commerce Commission 66 and the Civil Aeronautics
Board. 37 Presumably, then, these agencies now have or in time will develop
expertise in an obviously technical matter. If expertise is the test of the rule,
there should be primary administrative jurisdiction of the question of negli-
gence in the case of an air crash or train wreck. And since the questions of
injury and causal relation involve highly technical medical matters, these too
65. Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
It may be noted that some of the semantic confusion as to the legislative-judicial dichoto-
my that appeared in the Chicago, Rock Island case, note 64 supra, seems to persist in
Justice Brandeis' analysis. Distinguishing initially between the judicial and the legislative
functions, he goes on to suggest that both functions are shunted fr9m courts to Commission
for the same reason (the reason being that the essence of a question is fact or technical
dis cretion), that the same rule of primary jurisdiction applies to both functions, and in-
ferentially that the courts perform both functions until the rule applies. As pointed out in
note 64 supra, the rule is only necessary, and only applicable, when the function in question
is a judicial one that would, but for the rule, be exercisable by the courts.
6f6. 36 STAT. 299 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
67. 52 STAT. 1007 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 551 (1952).
195ti
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
should be subject to the rule. In short, the qualification that technical matters
must be involved is not a limitation of real significance.
The difficulty with expertise as a test for applicability of the rule, therefore,
is that it is a compass with an unvarying needle. Turn it whichever way, in
whatever situation, it points invariably to primary jurisdiction. It can have
validity only if the purpose of primary jurisdiction is to put all litigation
involving regulated industries into the exclusive administrative province. But
in that case the difficult search for an appropriate test culminates in the dis-
concerting discovery that tests are superfluous.
Whether adjudication by experts is desirable is not the question. Much can
be said for it. But it cannot be achieved without sacrificing other things for
which much can likewise be said. To mention one, trial by expert and trial
by jury are mutually exclusive. And limitations upon the latter should be
effected not by inadvertent encroachment but by constitutional means, or at
least by explicit legislative declaration.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS: THE SUPERSESSION
THEORY AND TIE ABSENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
Another touchstone than uniformity or expertise has appeared in the area
where the antitrust jurisdiction of the courts comes in contact with the regu-
lative jurisdiction of administrative agencies. And a new doctrinal twist-the
idea of supersession-has been added to the rule of primary jurisdiction.
The application of the primary jurisdiction rule to antitrust cases is ex-
emplified by United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co.0 8 Here
suit was brought against a group of shipping lines to enjoin an alleged com-
bination and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, the crux of the com-
plaint being that the defendants had established a dual system of rates, and
made the lower rates available to shippers who agreed to use defendants' ships
exclusively. Holding that the Shipping Act covered the dominant facts in the
case and that "the allegations either constitute direct and basic charges of
violations of these [Shipping Act] provisions or are so interrelated with such
charges as to be... a component part of them," the Supreme Court concluded
that "the remedy is that afforded by the Shipping Act, which to that extent
supersedes the antitrust laws," and that the "matter, therefore, is within the
exclusive preliminary jurisdiction of the Shipping Board." 69
The idea of supersession to an extent makes explicit what is often implicit
in the rule of primary jurisdiction. For example, where a common law pro-
ceeding in the Texas courts was denied in Abilene, the shipper was relegated
to a statutory proceeding which had in effect superseded it. But the statutory
remedy-reparations granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or by
68. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
69. Id. at 485. This decision was held to be controlling in Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). For a discussion of the procedural tangles in the
FMB-regulated maritime industry, see Note, 64 YALE LU. 569 (1955).
Vol. 65:315
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
the courts after a Commission determination-was equivalent to the shipper's
common law remedy of damages. Where the antitrust laws were held to be
superseded by another regulatory scheme, however, there might be no remedy
under that scheme comparable to what Congress had provided in the antitrust
legislation. And so in a number of antitrust suits where the rule of primary
jurisdiction has been invoked, the courts have looked to see whether an ad-
ministrative remedy for the wrong complained of would be available if the
rule were applied.70 That is, availability of an administrative remedy is a
factor in determining to what extent antitrust jurisdiction remains in the
courts or has been superseded by the regulatory commission's jurisdiction. Put
another way, availability of an administrative remedy becomes a test of the
applicability of the rule of primary jurisdiction.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. 71 is an example of the use of the adminis-
trative remedy approach. It held to be outside the scope of the rule of
primary jurisdiction a suit to restrain a rate-fixing conspiracy. Justice Doug-
las, speaking for the majority, pointed out that section 16 of the Clayton Act,
while authorizing injunctions against violations of the antitrust laws, forbids
suits therefor by anyone other than the United States against common car-
riers in respect of any matter "subject to the regulation, supervision or other
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. ' 72 Thus a suit by
Georgia to set aside the rates of the defendants resulting from the alleged
conspiracy could not have been entertained. 73 But, said Justice Douglas:
"Georgia in this proceeding is not seeking an injunction against the
continuance of any tariff; nor does she seek to have any tariff provision
cancelled. She merely asks that the alleged rate-fixing combination and
conspiracy among the defendant-carriers be enjoined .... But Congress
has not given the Commission comparable authority to remove rate-fixing
combinations from the prohibitions contained in the anti-trust laws." 74
Consequently, this was not a matter "subject to the regulation, supervision,
or other jurisdiction" of the Commission, and thus not within the exception
of section 16 of the Clayton Act upon which the claim of supersession neces-
sarily rested. This is the context in which the opinion referred to the absence
of an administrative remedy. "It must be remembered that this is a suit to
dissolve an illegal combination or to confine it to the legitimate area of col-
laboration. That relief cannot be obtained from the Commission for it has no
supervisory authority over the combination.
' '7 5
70. United States Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) ; Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F. Supp.
199 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806
(1953); Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 78 F. Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii, 1948).
See also S. S. W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
71. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
72. 33 STAT. 737 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
73. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 454 (1945).
74. Id. at 455-56.
75. Id. at 460.
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Using the availability of an administrative remedy as a test of applicability
of the primary jurisdiction rule is a step in the right direction, for it suggests
a responsiveness to the intentions of Congress as regards the relationship be-
tween the regulatory statutes and the antitrust laws. And although it would
not alone serve as an adequate guide in all cases-it would not have changed
the result in Abilene-still because it implies that jurisdiction not conferred
upon the regulatory agency is retained by the courts, it would at least prevent
the application of the rule of primary jurisdiction to create a jurisdictional
vacuum.
THE JURISDICTIONAL VACUUM
The most extreme illustration of the faults of the rule of primary jurisdic-
tion is provided by Montana-Dakota Co. v. Public Service Co. 76 and Seatrain
Lines Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 77 where application of the rule left the plain-
tiffs without a forum.
In the Montana-Dakota case, defendant and plaintiff's predecessor, whilc
under common management, had interchanged electric energy for which it was
alleged defendant paid too little and charged too much. Claiming that the
rates were fraudulent and violative of the Federal Power Act's requirement
of reasonableness, and that its predecessor had been unable to complain to the
Federal Power Commission because of the interlocking directorates, plaintiff
sued for damages in a federal district court. The Supreme Court was unani-
mous in holding that there was no judicial jurisdiction to determine what
would have constituted a reasonable rate in the past.78
The majority, through Justice Jackson, held that the courts were likewise
without jurisdiction of any other question in the case. They rejected plaintiff's
claim of "constructive fraud presumed from the intercorporate relationship,"'
saying there could be no such presumption since that relationship had received
Commission approval. And, creating a jurisdictional vacuum, they held that
the Commission, having no authority to establish a rate retrospectively or to
grant reparations, was also without jurisdiction."
Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion. Conceding that the Com-
mission could neither award reparations nor fix rates retrospectively, lie
argued that it could at least advise the court as to what the reasonable rate
would have been. He said:
"We think, therefore, that a cause of action within the jurisdiction of
the district courts is stated by a complaint charging a distributor of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce (1) with buying or selling at
unreasonable rates, (2) with failure to comply with procedural re-
quirements of the Federal Power Act, and (3) with preventing others
76. 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
77. 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 916 (1953).
78. Montana-Dakota Co. v. Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-53 (1951).
79. Id. at 252.
80. Id. at 252-54.
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from resorting to the remedies afforded by that Act. In such cases the
district court should stay proceedings and request determination by the
Federal Power Commission of matters within the Commission's special
competence."s'
Implicit in the Frankfurter reasoning seems to be the proposition that juris-
diction that the administration agencies cannot exercise should remain in the
courts, unaffected by the rule.
The Seatrain case was an antitrust suit in which defendants were charged
with concerted action in restraint of trade. Seatrain was a common carrier by
water, having ships specially designed to carry loaded freight cars which were
delivered to and removed from the docks by railway. After litigation and pro-
ceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission extending over a period
of twenty years, Seatrain had procured a Commission order directing the
railroads participating in through routes with it to cease and desist from
refusing car interchange with it. But railroads not participating in through
routes with Seatrain were uniformly refusing to permit car interchange with it
although interchanging freely with other railroads. The Commission had con-
ducted an investigation of existing car interchange practices and had found no
need for promulgation of rules requiring alteration of interchange practices.
But the question of interchange with water carriers in general or with Seatrain
in particular was apparently not considered. 2 And in another proceeding the
Commission had held that it was without "jurisdiction to require a rail carrier
to permit delivery of its cars to a water carrier where through routes between
such rail and water carriers do not exist.
8 3
Seatrain sued for injunction and damages against the combination of rail-
roads. But the Third Circuit held the rule of primary jurisdiction applicable,
saying:
"In this situation Seatrain now asks the federal courts to decide that
the present rule of unrestricted car interchange among the railroads is
unlawful unless it shall be so modified and applied as to give Seatrain the
same status and privileges as a railroad under it. In other words Seatrain
wants the courts to say the railroads may not rightfully do something
which the Commission alone is empowered to regulate and control unless
they shall in addition do something else which goes beyond the area of
Commission concern. Such use of judicial power to condition or require
an enlarging modification of an arrangement which is presently effective
under Commission jurisdiction and sanction is just such an interference
81. Id. at 264. Emphasis in both the majority and minority opinions on exhaustion
of administrative remedies seems to confuse that rule with primary jurisdiction. Id. at 250,
259-61. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Recomsidered. The Anti-trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 577, 579 (1954), speaks of primary jurisdiction as involving "at some point a claim
enforceable by original judicial action," while under the exhaustion rule "the claim is
enforceable by administrative action alone; the judiciary is being invoked to correct or
quash the administrative action."
82. Car-Service, Freight Cars, 268 I.C.C. 687 (1947).
83. Investigation of Seatrain Lines, Inc., 206 I.C.C. 328, 343 (1935).
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with the administrative prerogative as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction




Montana-Dakota and Seatrain denied a forum to plaintiffs complaining of
actionable wrongs and substantial injury. Such a result seems patently wrong.
If it is correct to say that primary jurisdiction divests the courts of jurisdiction
that is within the administrative sphere then it seems reasonable to suppose
that the divestiture should not extend to jurisdiction that existing admini-
strative bodies do not and cannot exercise.
The question in each case was a judicial one. Whether and to what extent
a past rate was unreasonable, as in Montana-Dakota, is an issue that courts
have long adjudicated, at least in the common carrier field. It should be re-
membered that in Abilene this jurisdiction was taken from the courts because
otherwise there would be interference with the power expressly given to the
Commission to make retrospective rate determinations. In Montana-Dakota
there was no administrative authority either to make such determination or to
award reparations. This certainly justified, if it did not actually make oblig-
atory, a holding that the courts retained jurisdiction to determine the issue
with or without administrative advice.
The Seatrain reasoning likewise seems manifestly wrong. The defendants,
while freely interchanging cars among themselves, refused to interchange with
Seatrain. The Commission had approved the railroad interchange agreement
but lacked jurisdiction to approve or disapprove "such defining of the relation-
ship between Seatrain and railroads which do not share through routes with
it.,,8 5
Whether there has been a violation of the antitrust laws is again a judicial
question. What interference with the administrative function could result from
judicial determination of this question? If the court found in Seatrain's favor
it might enjoin further discrimination. This would give the defendants the
choice of two courses. They could afford Seatrain the right of interchange,
which would leave unchanged that part of the agreement that was subject to
Commission jurisdiction. Or they could put an end to free interchange even
among themselves. But the Commission, having authority to re-examine the
question, could either approve the new practice or order resumption of free
interchange. In either case it would be acting independently and without ju-
dicial interference. The court would merely have required lawful treatment
for Seatrain, something the Commission itself was powerless to do. The
important point, seemingly overlooked in the decision, is that regulated in-
dustries are subject to continual administrative scrutiny and that the inter-
change agreement could be ordered modified at any time upon the emergence
of a variety of new factors of which the antitrust decision would be only one.
Surely, proper regulation would have been furthered rather than impeded by
84. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir.), ccrt. denied,
345 U.S. 916 (1953).
85. Id., 207 F.2d at 261.
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judicial settlement of the antitrust question of which there was no administra-
tive jurisdiction.
The holding that matters beyond administrative jurisdiction may neverthe-
less be removed from the judicial pale by administrative approval of related
matters makes the jurisdictional vacuum inevitable. Unless such a vacuum
was specifically intended by Congress in enacting a regulatory law, it should
be avoided. Primary jurisdiction must require no more than the rendering
to the administrative Caesar of the jurisdiction that Congress intended should
be his.
FRAGMENTED JURISDICTION AND THE Two-STEP REMEDY
A vacuum of jurisdiction is not the only pitfall of the primary jurisdiction
rule. Even in its less extreme applications it subjects the parties to special
inconvenience. For inherent in the rule is fragmentation of jurisdiction.
Why is it called the rule of primary jurisdiction? Presumably, if primary
jurisdiction meant original jurisdiction that term of long usage would have
been used. But original jurisdiction is complete and the Interstate Commerce
Commission's jurisdiction was not. Under the original Act the Commission
could issue a reparation order, but that order was not binding upon either
the parties or the courts. Only when and to the extent that the order matured
into a judgment of the courts could it be enforced. Thus the original jurisdic-
tion of a claim for reparations was fragmented, the Commission functioning
as a screen that sifted out and kept from the courts those claims it deemed
to be without merit. The cases in which the Commission awarded reparations
came to the courts for de novo consideration, the Commission's findings being
prima facie but rebuttable evidence.
The 1906 amendment of the Act I" made Commission orders-except rep-
aration orders-binding on the parties until set aside by the Commission or
the courts. The burden that had theretofore been on the Commission to
seek judicial approval of its orders was transformed into the carrier's burden
to seek invalidation. But the jurisdiction nevertheless remained fragmented.
For if the claimant asked for and received an award of reparations from the
Commission the amendment was inapplicable, and the award was not binding
without judicial action. And on the other hand, if the claimant came within
the amendment by seeking only a determination that a rate, rule or practice had
been invalid, he would eventually have to go to the courts to obtain repara-
tions.8 7
The expense and delays involved in this two-step procedure have been
justifiably criticized. 8 High costs can put litigation out of the reach of claim-
ants. And it is a truism that justice delayed is often justice denied. To the
S6. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 5, 34 STAT. 591-92.
87. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Clark Coal Co., 238 U.S. 456, 471 (1914).
88. See, e.g., Schwartz, Prhnary Adininistrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of
Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J. 495 (1953).
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individual of modest means the expense of the two-step procedure may be pro-
hibitive. Courts in cases of this kind have required primary administrative
determination of the reasonableness of the cancellation of an airplane flight
where damages were sought ;89 the lawfulness of an airline tariff disclaiming
liability for loss of jewelry ;90o and the validity of a tariff requiring notice of
claim within thirty days as a prerequisite to a suit for damages for personal
injuries or death allegedly due to the carrier's negligence. 91
Cases such as these point up both the burdensomeness of the two-step pro-
cedure and the need to weigh that factor against countervailing considerations
in determining applicability of the rule. For it should be kept in mind that
fragmentation of jurisdiction is inherent in primary jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The rule of primary jurisdiction ought to serve the necessary purpose of
setting the boundaries between the province of the courts and that of the
administrative agencies created by Congress, so that the courts do not need-
lessly interfere with the functions vested in the agencies by Congress. But the
rule has not served the purpose well. At its inception it was employed to
frustrate the explicitly declared purpose of Congress; in full bloom it has de-
prived aggrieved parties of any remedy whatsoever, without reference to the
purposes of Congress. The trouble has been that the formulas used in the
application of the rule-uniformity and expertise-are false guides that can
only lead to confusion and misapplication. And since whenever applied it has
tended to diminish the scope of jury trial in favor of administrative determi-
nation, and to put the plaintiff to a more elaborate and expensive procedure,
the rule cries for a sensible touchstone of applicability-one that will pay the
price for forfeiture of judicial jurisdiction only when that price has clearly been
contemplated by Congress. For since it is Congress that creates the adminis-
trative jurisdiction out of which the problem of conflicting jurisidictions origi-
nates, it is in congressional intent that the problem's solution should be found.
The really germane subject for inquiry, then, is the kind and scope of the
regulation delegated by the governing act; and the test question is whether
initial judicial determination of a given issue will interfere with administrative
regulation. The answers will not be the same under all acts or with respect to
all regulated industries. The regulatory power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission differs in kind and scope from that of the Federal Power Com-
89. Adler v. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. 1%1o. 1941).
90. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
91. In re Continental Charters, Inc., 3 PIXy. & FISCHER AD. L. DEC. (2d ser.) 130
(CAB 1953). In the unreported district court case the question of the lawfulness of the
tariff was held to be within the primary jurisdiction of the Board. But see Thomas v.
American Airlines, Inc., "104 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Ark. 1952) (tariff ineffective as disclaimer
of liability for negligence) ; Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, 102 F. Supp. 631
(S.D. Fla. 1952) (tariff ineffective as a defense to wrongful death action) ; Wilhelmy v.
Northwest Airlines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949) (tariff held lawful).
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mission. Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Commission's supervisory power
over railroads differs from its power over oil pipe lines. Consequently, in a
similar state of facts, primary jurisdiction may be appropriate for one industry
and altogether inappropriate for another. Obviously, what is required is not
an indiscriminate but a selective application of the rule, attainable only by the
test of legislative intent.
This test would bring all primary jurisdiction cases, within and without
the antitrust field, into harmony, for whether the antitrust laws have been
superseded is a question of statutory purpose. It should also help to eliminate
the jurisdictional vacuum. Judicial exercise of initial jurisdiction of a matter
that is not within the administrative scope is not likely to run counter to the
statutory scheme of regulation. Moreover, this test puts primary jurisdiction
in its proper perspective. The essential purpose of the rule is to define the
borders of judicial and administrative jurisdiction. Since, but for the rule,
the issue would be one for the courts, that definition must be derived from
the nature and extent of the authority to regulate. Finally, abandonment of
such cliches as uniformity and expertise- will serve the salutory purpose of
clearing the air. And supplanting them with a test under which jurisdiction
turns upon the kind and extent of the regulation prescribed by Congress will
contribute to the equally desirable result of keeping judicial construction in
harmony with legislative purpose.
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